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LOCAL EQUALIZATION PRACTICE
IN CALIFORNIA
Alexander R. Early*
NATURE OF BoARDs OF EQUALIZATION.
Our boards of equalization are created by article XIII, section
9 of the California constitution. The State Board of Equalization
assesses the properties described in section 14 of the same article,
which are basically public utilities termed "State assessed prop-
erty."' The state board also assesses and equalizes certain munici-
pally-owned property located outside the limits of the municipal
entity which owns it.2
The local county boards of supervisors perform the function of
county boards of equalization. It is their duty "to equalize the
valuation of the taxable property in the county for the purpose of
taxation."' They may not adjust the assessments of property as-
sessed by the State Board of Equalization,4 nor those of publicly-
owned land.5 They may equalize assessments of property which it
is the duty of the county assessor to assess, direct the assessor to
assess taxable property which has escaped assessment, change the
quantity or description of property, and cancel assessments and
make new ones where the originals are incomplete.6
The supreme court has held that the county board has the
duty to determine the value of all property for assessment purposes
upon the same basis. In making such determination:
"the board is exercising judicial functions, and its decision as to the
value of the property and the fairness of the assessment so far as
amount is concerned constitutes an independent and conclusive judg-
ment of the tribunal created by law for the determination of that
question," adjudicating necessarily that "property is assessed at the
same value proportionately as all the other property in the coun-
ty,". ... .7
* B.A., Cornell, 1938; LL.B., Harvard University, 1941. Member, California Bar.
Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles County, California.
I CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 108.
2 CAL. Co NsT. art. XIII, § 1; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 1822, 1867 and 1901.
3 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 9; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1603.
4 People v. Supervisors of Sacramento County, 15 Cal. 321 (1881).
5 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. N.S.-3640, 10 July 1941.
6 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1611.
7 Southern Pacific Land Co. v. San Diego County, 183 Cal. 543, 546, 191 Pac. 931,
933 (1920).
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The decision of the board will not be reversed unless there is a show-
ing of arbitrary action on the part of the board or of some action
which is equivalent to fraud. Recently in Eastern-Columbia, Inc. v.
County of Los Angeles,' the court held that "county boards of
equalization are creatures of the Constitution itself (art. XIII, sec.
9, California State Constitution), and are quasi-judicial bodies."'
LOCAL EQUALIZATION FOR PROPERTY TAXPAYERS
In California a taxpayer's only opportunity to obtain relief
from an assessment of his property for ad valorem tax purposes
that he contends is unfair, excessive, or discriminatory is by peti-
tion to the appropriate board of equalization.' 0 There is a disputable
presumption that the assessment is correct;" hence the burden of
proof is on the taxpayer.' This presumption is a formidable obsta-
cle. It is evidence' 3 and will support a decision in favor of an assess-
ment even in the face of strong uncontradicted evidence of the
opposing party. 4 In Hannon v. Madden" a taxpayer sought to
invalidate assessments, charging the local board of trustees with
fraud in imposing assessments and in denying relief when the assess-
ments were protested. The court upheld the valuations because the
taxpayer failed to establish fraud or an abuse of discretion by
evidence sufficiently convincing to overcome the presumption. The
court said:
If official acts may be explained on any reasonable theory of duty
honestly, even though mistakenly performed, they must be resolved
in favor of the presumption, which may not be lightly ignored. This
is doubly true where no substantial evidence, as in the instant case,
points to a corrupt motive or dishonest purpose on the part of the
8 61 Cal. App. 2d 734, 143 P.2d 992 (1943).
9 Id. at 745, 143 P.2d at 998; see also Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los
Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 320, 333 P.2d 323, 326-27 (1958); Universal Consolidated
Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Cal. 2d 353, 356-57, 153 P.2d 746, 748-49 (1944).
10 CAL. CONST. art XIII, §§ 9 and 14; CAL. Rxv. & TAX. CODE §§ 1603, 1604,
1620-29, 1822, 1867 and 1901; Bank of America v. Mundo, 37 Cal. 2d 1, 229 P.2d 345
(1951).
11 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1963(15); Universal Consolidated Oil Co. v. Byram,
25 Cal. 2d 353, 360, 153 P.2d 746, 751 (1944); Rickard v. Council of Santa Barbara,
49 Cal. App. 58, 61, 192 Pac. 726, 727 (1920).
12 Bank of America v. Mundo, 37 Cal.. 2d 1, 5, 229 P.2d 345, 347 (1951) ; Utah
Construction Co. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 654, 203 Pac. 401, 403 (1921) ; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 124, 126-27, 116 Pac. 564,
565 (1911).
13 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1957, 206 (2).
14 Endo v. State Board of Equalization, 143 Cal. App. 2d 395, 400, 300 P.2d 366,
370 (1956); accord, Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co., 212 Cal. 540, 549, 299 Pac. 529,
532 (1931); People v. Siemsen, 153 Cal. 387, 390-91, 95 Pac. 863, 865 (1908); 18
CAL. Juit. 2d, Rebuttable Presumptions 493, 504.
15 214 Cal. 251, 5 P.2d 4 (1931).
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accused. A wide divergence of views, especially in matters where local
taxation is involved, frequently exists.16
The United States Supreme Court has recognized this principle in
property tax assessment cases.17
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
Repeatedly the courts have stated the general rule that before
a taxpayer may seek judicial relief from an excessive assessment
he must first exhaust his administrative remedy with the appro-
priate board of equalization.'" Although there are exceptions, they
must be clearly understood, since failure to seek relief from the
board of equalization when required is fatal.' 9 This was dramati-
cally illustrated in the companion cases of Luce v. City of San
Diego2" and Mahoney v. City of San Diego.2' In each case tax-
payers challenged assessments as unfair and discriminatory because
land, improvements, and personal property had admittedly been
valued by the assessor at different fractions of value. The taxpayers
in Mahoney initially sought relief from the local board of equaliza-
tion, but those in Luce did not. The board denied the petitions of
the taxpayers in the Mahoney case, but this was reversed by the
California Supreme Court. Simultaneously the court denied relief
to the plaintiffs in the Luce case solely because they had failed to
petition the local board of equalization for a reduction of their
assessments. As the two cases involved identical facts, it is unlikely
that the plaintiffs in the Luce case would have been more fortunate
in a hearing before the board of equalization than were those in
the Mahoney case. Nevertheless, exhaustion of that remedy is
jurisdictional to the courts.
The fact that an administrative board has already decided
other cases involving similar facts adversely to the petitioner will
never excuse disregarding the administrative remedy.22 Likewise,
16 Id. at 268, 5 P.2d at 11.
17 Great Northern Railroad Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 139, (1935) (Butler).
18 Bank of America v. Mundo, 37 Cal. 2d 1, 4, 229 P.2d 345, 347 (1951);
Security-First Nat'l Bank v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 319, 320-21, 217 P.2d
946, 947 (1950).
19 Dawson v. County of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 2d 77, 81, 98 P.2d 495, 497 (1940);
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. App. 2d 119, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 316 (1962); Marsh Wall Products, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 193 Cal.
App. 2d 58, 62, 13 Cal. Rptr. 699, 701 (1961); DeMille v. County of Los Angeles,
25 Cal. App. 2d 506, 509, 77 P.2d 905, 906 (1938) ; Globe Grain Milling Co. v. County
of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. App. 297, 216 Pac. 631 (1923).
20 198 Cal. 405, 245 Pac. 196 (1926).
21 198 Cal. 388, 245 Pac. 189 (1926).
22 Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 300-01, 109 P.2d 942,
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a taxpayer may not contest an action for collection of a delinquent
tax on the ground of excessive assessment unless he has first ex-
hausted his remedy before the board of equalization.2"
There are exceptions to the requirement that an aggrieved
taxpayer must first seek relief from the board of equalization be-
fore seeking relief in court where: (1) property has been assessed
which was wholly or partly exempt; 24 (2) the assessor has errone-
ously assumed the existence of, and proceeded to assess, property
which was non-existent; 25 (3) property outside the jurisdiction
has been included in the assessment; 26 or (4) the property taxed
was owned by someone other than the person to whom it was
assessed 2' and was not otherwise taxable to the assessee as the
person claiming, possessing, or controlling it.28
Many of the earlier opinions implied that an attack upon an
assessment in part, rather than in toto, raised an issue of over-
evaluation that required initial presentation to the board of equali-
zation.29 This rule was ignored in Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp.
v. Boyd"0 and was expressly disapproved in Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v.
Quinn." In the Star-Kist case the court held that "the necessity
of recourse to the board is properly determined by the nature of
the issues in dispute, and not by whether an assessment is attacked
in part or in toto."' 2 The test applied in this important opinion
was whether there was a factual question of valuation which the
953 (1941); City of Los Angeles v. California Towel & Linen Supply Co., 217 A.C.A.-
450, 456, 31 Cal. Rptr. 832, 840 (1963).
23 People v. Keith Railway Equipment Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 339, 346, 161 P.2d
244, 249 (1945) ; accord, People v. Sonleitner, 186 Cal. App. 2d 350, 371, 8 Cal. Rptr.
528, 541 (1960).
24 Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Boyd, 43 Cal. 2d 157, 272 P.2d 16 (1954);
Third & Broadway Building Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 220 Cal. 660, 32 P.2d 377
(1934) ; Brenner v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 72, 116 Pac. 397 (1911) ; Parrott
& Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 131 Cal. App. 2d 332, 280 P.2d 881
(1955) ; City of Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal. App. 655, 292 Pac. 539
(1930).
25 Pacific Coast Co. v. Wells, 134 Cal. 471, 66 Pac. 657 (1901); Associated Oil
Co. v. County of Orange, 4 Cal. App. 2d 5, 40 P.2d 887 (1935).
26 Kern River Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 164 Cal. 751, 130 Pac. 714 (1913);
Stewart etc. Co. v. County of Alameda, 142 Cal. 660, 76 Pac. 481 (1904).
27 Weyse v. Crawford, 85 Cal. 196, 24 Pac. 735 (1890); Teater v. Johnson, 95
Cal. App. 182, 272 Pac. 313 (1928).
28 CAL. REy. & TAX. CODE, § 405; Tilden v. County of Orange, 89 Cal. App.
2d 586, 201 P.2d 86 (1949).
29 See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo, 36 Cal.
2d 196, 201, 222 P.2d 860, 863 (1950) ; These cases are exhaustively reviewed in Van
Alstyne, Equalization as a Prerequisite to Recovery oj Taxes on Exempt Property,
1 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 303 (1954).
80 43 Cal. 2d 157, 165, 272 P.2d 16, 21-22 (1954).
31 54 Cal. 2d 507, 354 P.2d 1, 6 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1960); see, comment, 48 CALF
L. REv. 806, 813 (1960).
52 Id. at 510, 354 P.2d at 3, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
LOCAL EQUALIZATION PRACTICE
board has special competence to decide. 3 Since the only issue was
the constitutionality of section 107.1 of the California Revenue and
Taxation Code, which established the method of valuing certain
possessory interests in realty, the court held that recourse to the
local board of equalization was not required before the taxpayer
sought a judicial determination."4
The courts have made it clear that if an assessment is legally
a nullity, there is no requirement to bring the matter before the
board of equalization as a prerequisite to judicial relief.35 This
principle will undoubtedly govern the determination of an issue
posed in the trial courts of several counties, i.e., must questions
of the classification of property as personalty or fixtures (the
latter are taxable as real property 6) be submitted to the board of
equalization? There is no simple answer. The cases uniformly sup-
port the conclusion that if misclassification results in a void assess-
ment, resort to the board of equalization is unnecessary;37 but if
the property remains taxable despite such misclassification, al-
though perhaps at a lower tax rate,38 resort to the board of equali-
zation is required."9 Discrimination results if property which is
liable for taxation either as realty or as personalty is misclassified
and is consequently subjected to incorrect tax rates. Questions of
discrimination are always matters for the board of equalization. °
On the other hand, if tax-exempt personal property such as that
owned by national banks4 or possessory interests in tax-exempt
government-owned personal property42 should be misclassified as
fixtures on the assessment roll, the assessment is a nullity and
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Stafford v. Riverside County, 155 Cal. App. 2d 474, 318 P.2d 172 (1957).
36 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 103-06.
37 See Trabue Pittman Corp. v. County of Los Angeles 29 Cal. 2d 385, 175 P.2d
512 (1946).
38 Certain special taxing districts such as lighting maintenance districts and the
Los Angeles County Flood Control District have power to tax realty but not per-
sonalty. Los Angeles County Flood Control Act § 10, Uncodified Water Act, Cal. Stats.
1915, ch. 755 § 10, p. 4463.
39 Security-First Nat'l Bank v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 319, 320, 217
P.2d 946, 947 (1950); Citizens' Federal Say. & Loan Assn. v. City & County of San
Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 358, 20 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1962); California Domestic
Water Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. App. 185, 190, 101 Pac. 547, 549 (1909);
accord, Simms v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d 303, 217 P.2d 936 (1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 891.
40 Ibid.
41 Rev. Stat. § 5219, 12 U.S.C.A. § 548; CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 16; see Security-
First Nat'l Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 55 Cal. 2d 407, 11 Cal. Rptr. 289, 359 P.2d
625 (1961).
42 General Dynamics Corp. v. Los Angeles County, 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d 794
(1958).
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application to the board of equalization for relief is not a necessary
prerequisite to court action. 3
Some experienced attorneys avoid this problem by first petition-
ing the board of equalization for relief in all matters involving
assessments for property tax-purposes. Thus they bring their cases
within the rule that "when a board of equalization purports to
decide a question of law, or refuses to hear a case on the ground
that it involves only a question of law to be decided by the courts,
a taxpayer has the right to resort to the courts for determination
of such question." '44 Even though it appears probable that an assess-
ment may be declared altogether void by a court, if evidence of
overvaluation exists, astute counsel will not overlook the possi-
bility of partial relief in the form of a reduction in assessed value
by the board of equalization. In recent years county boards of
equalization have been noted for their liberality in reducing the
assessments on fraternal lodges, private schools, and non-profit
quasi-charitable properties. Taxpayer suits to set aside such reduc-
tions are rare. 5 Furthermore, Revenue and Taxation Code section
504 was amended by the 1963 Legislature to permit the reduction
of a penal assessment40 by the county board of equalization."7
CLERICAL ERROR
The situation of the overassessed taxpayer who has neglected
to take advantage of his administrative remedy by petitioning the
board of equalization for relief is not always hopeless. If an over-
assessment was caused by a clerical error of the assessor and the
intended assessment can be ascertained from any papers in the
assessor's office, the error may be corrected on the assessment roll
under Revenue and Taxation Code section 4831. If a tax based
on such an overassessment has already been paid, a refund may
be obtained under section 5096(c).
Likewise, overassessment of personal property caused by er-
roneous information furnished by a taxpayer 48 to the assessor may
be corrected on the assessment roll, if the error can be ascertained
43 Cf., Pajaro Valley Bank v. County of Santa Cruz, 207 Cal. App. 2d 621, 24
Cal. Rptr. 639 (1962).
44 Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 322, 333
P.2d 323, 327 (1958); cf., Universal Consolidated Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Cal. 2d 353,
153 P.2d 746 (1944).
45 Stamps v. Board of Supervisors, San Francisco Superior Court No. 524760, Aug.
30, 1962.
46 CAL. Rav. & TAX. CODE §§ 501, 503-505; cf., CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§
1062-63.
47 Cal. Stats. 1963. ch. 1947.
48 See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 441, 442, 445 and 454.
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by the assessor from an audit of the taxpayer's books of account
or other papers. If, however, the tax has already been paid, it is
doubtful whether section 5096 will permit payment of a refund.
This legislative oversight will undoubtedly be corrected at the next
regular session of the Legislature. Similar provisions5 ° govern the
correction of errors made by the State Board of Equalization in
assessing state assessed property."
EQUALIZATION HEARINGS
A county board of equalization begins proceedings after giving
notice as prescribed by its rules."2 The board may increase or lower
any assessment on the local roll in order to achieve equalization.5"
So long as the required notice is given, the board may act on its
own initiative to raise an assessment even in the absence of a
complaint stating that it is too low and requesting that it be in-
creased.54 Actual notice is sufficient.55 Any defects or informalities
in the form of the notice are waived by the appearance of the
taxpayer.5
Particularly significant is the holding in Birch v. Board of
Supervisors57 that notice must be of the intended action of the
board. In that case after a hearing on the taxpayers' petition for
assessment reduction, the board increased the assessment. Despite
the presence and participation of the taxpayers at the hearing, the
court held that the board lacked power to increase the assessment
because of its failure to give the taxpayers notice of its intention to
do sol The court refused to invoke the doctrine of estoppel.
A county board of equalization may raise or lower individual
assessments, but not the entire assessment roll.' This prevents
use of an obvious device to circumvent statutory ceilings on tax
rates. The State Board of Equalization may increase or lower the
entire roll of any county in order to achieve intercounty equaliza-
49 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 4831.5.
50 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 4876 and 4876.5.
51 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 108 defines "State assessed property" as including all
property subject to local taxation which § 14 of art. XIII of the CAL. CONST. requires
the State Board of Equalization to assess. This consists primarily of public utility
properties.
52 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1605.
53 Ibid.
54 Allison Ranch Mining Co. v. Nevada Co., 104 Cal. 161, 37 Pac. 875 (1894).
55 Ibid.
56 Savings & Loan Security v. San Francisco, 146 Cal. 673, 679, 80 Pac. 1086,
1089 (1905).
57 191 Cal. 235, 215 Pac. 903 (1923).
58 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1606.
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tion,5" but may change only those individual assessments which it
has itself made. 0
EQUALIZATION SEASONS
With the exception (commencing in 1964) of Los Angeles
County,61 boards of supervisors meet as boards of equalization
annually on the first Monday in July to equalize the assessment
of property on the local roll.12 The code requires that they continue
in session for that purpose, from time to time, until the business of
equalization is completed, "but not later than the third Monday
in July."6 There is a wide-spread misconception among board
members and tax officials that because of this provision the life
of a county board of equalization expires at midnight of the third
Monday in July (or the last day to which an extension has been
granted under Revenue and Taxation Code section 155); that
thereafter the board lacks jurisdiction to act. Boards in several
counties conduct hearings of marathon duration, severely restrict
the time for cross-examination and argument, and unnecessarily
subject themselves to the charge of being impatient and arbitrary,
in an attempt to complete the hearings before this illusory deadline.
Actually, the courts have always reasoned that this provision
is directory and not jurisdictional." In Universal Consolidated
Oil Co. v. Byram6" the court voided the action of the board of
equalization. It was argued that the court should then compute
the correct assessment of the taxpayer's property rather than re-
mand the case to the board of equalization to make this determina-
tion because the equalization period had expired. The supreme
court disagreed. It conceded that:
the life of the board of equalization is limited by statute, but that
provision is directory only and does not deflect from the statutory
scheme that the authorized tribunal pass upon matters properly with-
in its jurisdiction though in the completion of its work it must act
at a time beyond the prescribed period.66
9 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 9; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 1815-1832.5.
60 Wells Fargo & Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 56 Cal. 191 (1880).
61 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 2077; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 1750, 1760.
62 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1603.
63 Ibid. Also note that CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 155 permits the State Board of
Equalization to extend the time fixed for the performance of any act by a county
board of equalization "for not more than 30 days, or, in case of public calamity, 40
days."
64 Universal Consolidated Oil Company v. Byram, 25 Cal. 2d 353, 153 P.2d 746
(1944) ; Whiting Finance Co. v. Hopkins, 199 Cal. 428, 249 Pac. 853 (1926) ; Busswell
v. Board of Supervisors, 116 Cal. 351, 48 Pac. 226 (1897); Crothers v. County of
Santa Cruz, 151 Cal. App. 2d 219, 223, 311 P.2d 557, 559 (1957).
65 Ibid.
66 Id. at 362-63, 153 P.2d at 752.
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So long as a proper application for assessment reduction67 is timely
filed, this reasoning indicates that if necessary, it may be heard
and decided even after the stroke of statutory midnight.
Equalization hearings upon escape or penal assessments"8 which
are made outside the regular period may be held at the request of
the assessor or any taxpayer at any regular meeting of the board
of supervisors during the calendar month following the month in
which the assessment is made. 69
In Los Angeles County equalization petitions may be filed
between the fourth Monday in September and the fourth Monday
in November; hearings may take place from the fourth Monday
in September until the last day of the following March.70 Pursuant
to section 9.5 of article XIII of the California constitution and
Revenue and Taxation Code sections 1620-29, the Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors has created two tax appeals boards
to perform this function in that county commencing in 1964.
FoRm OF PETITIONS
Section 1607 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides that
no reduction shall be made in an assessment on the local roll
"unless the party affected or his agent makes and files with the
county board a verified, written application for it, showing the facts
claimed to require the reduction." The purpose of this application
is to give the assessor an opportunity to investigate before the
hearing. 71 Consequently, informality in these petitions is allowed,
but merely indentifying an assessment and stating that it is "pro-
tested" is not enough.72 Statements of the ground upon which
relief was sought such as "unequal value," when coupled with a
description of the property, its assessed value, and the requested
assessed value, have been held to be sufficient.7" Even where the
petition to the board of equalization merely alleged "excessive
valuation," it was considered adequate where the application was
presented on a form prescribed by the county, and no objection
was made to its sufficiency either at the time of filing or at the
hearing. 74
67 See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1607.
68 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 503, 531, 531.5 and 1061.
69 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1604.
70 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1760 (Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 2077).
71 Bandini Estate Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227, 82
P.2d 185, 187 (1938) ; County of Los Angeles v. Ransohoff, 24 Cal. App. 2d 238, 241,
74 P.2d 828, 830 (1937).
72 DeMille v. Los Angeles County, 25 Cal. App. 2d 506, 77 P.2d 905 (1938).
73 County of Los Angeles v. Ransohoff, 24 Cal. App. 2d 238, 74 P.2d 828 (1937).
74 Bandini Estate Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227, 82
P.2d 185, 187 (1938).
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EQUALIZATION IssuEs
The "equalization" of the assessed value of petitioner's prop-
erty with that of the other property in the district is the purpose
of all equalization proceedings. 75 Was there any discrimination or
unfairness in the assessment of the petitioner's property that results
in subjecting it to a disproportionate share of the property tax
burden?7 1 Was the property improperly classified as fixtures in-
stead of personalty, thus subjecting it to additional special assess-
ment district charges? 77 Is it one of the most frequent type of case
in which the petitioner alleges that his property has not been
"assessed at the same value proportionately as all other property
in the county"?
7 8
Solvent credits, the only intangible personal property now
taxed in California, are taxed at a different tax rate than other
property.79 Thus a board of equalization must consider the relative
tax burden imposed on such property generally throughout the
county, if discrimination is alleged in their assessment.8 ° Intangibles
are assessed at their actual value8 rather than at a fraction.
The equalization of escape and penal assessments involves
additional issues peculiar to the requirements of the statutes under
which they are made. In most cases there are only two questions
of fact for the board of equalization to consider: (1) the fair
market value of the property involved, and (2) the ratio (or frac-
tion) of assessed value to fair market value generally prevailing
throughout the county.8 3 Multiplication of the two gives an assessed
value as equalized with property generally throughout the county.
This value can then be compared by the board with the actual assess-
ment of which complaint is made. If the actual assessment is higher
than this equalized value, it should be correspondingly reduced.
No matter how sympathetic a board of equalization may be to a
petitioning taxpayer, it cannot grant any relief unless it can deter-
mine from the evidence before it both the fair market value of
the petitioner's property and the fraction (or ratio) of fair market
75 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 9; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 1603-05, 1821-23, 1832.5.
76 Dawson v. Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 2d 77, 98 P.2d 495 (1940).
77 Simms v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 303, 315, 217 P.2d 936, 944 (1950).
78 McClelland v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. 2d 124, 129, 180 P.2d 676, 679
(1947).
79 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 2153.
80 Dawson v. Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 2d 77, 98 P.2d 495 (1940); CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, § 14.
81 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1059.
82 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 503, 531, 531.5 and 1061.
83 A. F. Gilmore Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. App. 2d 471, 476-77, 9
Cal. Rptr. 67, 71 (1960).
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value at which property generally has been assessed throughout
the entire county. Unless the taxpayer introduces substantial evi-
dence of fair market value and the general assessment ratio, he
will have failed to make a prima facie case entitling him to relief.
The district court of appeal in Wild Goose Country Club v.
County of Buttea* upheld the decision of the board of equalization
because no evidence. was presented at the board hearing of the
value of the taxpayer's land. 5 The same result was reached in
Merchants Trust Company v. Hopkins,86 where the court stated:
no evidence of any inequality of assessment, and no competent evi-
dence of the value of the property assessed, [was] presented to the
board of equalization. It is evident from this that appellant did not
sustain the burden of proof which rested upon it in the proceeding
before the board of equalization to show that the assessment was
either unequal or excessive and hence cannot now attack the action
of the board on either of those grounds.87
Similar decisions were rendered in Southern California Telephone
Co. v. County of Los Angeles,"' where the court affirmed a superior
court nonsuit involving millions of dollars because there was no
proof of value, 9 and Crothers v. County of Santa Cruz,90 where
the court again required proof of fair market value."
It has often been unsuccessfully argued that a particular assess-
ment need not be compared with the assessments of properties gen-
erally throughout the county, but that it is sufficient if comparison
is made with a small number of other properties. 2 The courts have
repeatedly rejected this argument. The rule in the Wild Goose
Country Club case is expressly followed in Birch v. County of
Orange,"5 the court holding that the assessment in question should
be compared with the average assessment of all the other properties
in the county to determine whether an unequal burden has been
placed on the petitioning taxpayer. The court then dismissed the
contention that it is sufficient if comparison is made with a small
number of properties by stating that "when it is shown that his
assessment is not disproportionate to that of other property gener-
ally, to reduce his assessment merely because the property of a few
84 60 Cal. App. 339, 212 Pac. 711 (1922).
85 Id. at 341, 212 Pac. at 711.
86 103 Cal. App. 473, 284 Pac. 1072 (1930).
87 Id. at 479, 284 Pac. at 1074.
88 45 Cal. App. 2d 111, 113 P.2d 773 (1941).
89 Id. at 126, 113 P.2d at 782.
90 151 Cal. App. 2d 219, 311 P.2d 557 (1957).
91 Id. at 225, 311 P.2d at 560.
92 E.g., see appellant's briefs in A. F. Gilmore Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 186
Cal. App. 2d 471, 9 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1960).
93 88 Cal. App. 82, 262 Pac. 788 (1927).
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others is assessed too low would only increase the inequalities al-
ready existing in the assessment-roll of the county."94 There is
an impressive line of cases both before and after the Birch decision
which support this view that the challenged assessment is to be com-
pared with the average assessment of all other property in the
county. 5 This is the general rule followed throughout the United
States. 6
Perhaps the error most frequently made by petitioners is that
of proving that a relatively small number of other properties are
underassessed as compared with their own assessments. Such a spot
disparity does not establish a right to relief. 7 The comparison must
be with the county-wide average. Even proof by a complaining
taxpayer that other taxpayers have escaped taxation altogether
affords no reason for invalidating his assessments.9 8
Proof that the assessor has used an erroneous method of valu-
ing property carries no weight unless the taxpayer also shows that
the resulting assessment is excessive or discriminatory.9 If the
resulting assessment is correct, the method used to arrive at the
assessment is unimportant; if the result is clearly wrong, the
method would not save it.' 00
Neither by constitution nor by statute is the assessor directed
to follow any particular method to determine value.'01 The test is
not what someone else thinks is a proper method of valuation, but
whether the method used by the assessor was legitimate, fair, and
94 Id. at 86, 262 Pac. at 789.
95 McClelland v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. 2d 124, 180 P.2d (1947) cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 823 (1947); Los Angeles Gas and Electric Co. v. County of Los
Angeles, 162 Cal. 164, 121 Pac. 384 (1912) ; City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo,
167 Cal. App. 736, 335 P.2d 166 (1959).
96 In re Rick's Appeal, 402 Pa. 209, 67 A.2d 261 (1961); Robinson v. Stewart,
316 Ore. 532, 339 P.2d 432 (1959) ; Redmond v. City of Jackson, 143 Miss. 114, 108
So. 144 (1926) ; Note, Inequality in Property Tax Assessments, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1374
(1962).
97 Rancho Santa Margarita v. San Diego County, 135 Cal. App. 134, 26 P.2d 716
(1933) ; Wild Goose Country Club v. County of Butte, 60 Cal. App. 339, 347, 212 Pac.
711, 714 (1922); Jat Company, Inc. v. Division of Tax Appeals (App. Div. 1957) 47
N.J. Super. 571, 136 A.2d 666, 672 (1950).
98 City of Los Angeles v. Western Union Oil Co., 161 Cal. 204, 207, 118 Pac. 720,
721 (1911) ; Alpaugh Irrigation District v. County of Kern, 113 Cal. App. 2d 286, 294,
248 P.2d 117, 121 (1952); Hammond Lumber Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 104
Cal. App. 235, 247, 285 Pac. 896, 901 (1930).
99 Ambassador Hotel Corporation v. County of Los Angeles, 94 Cal. App. 143,
147, 270 Pac. 726, 728 (1928).
100 Bailey v. Megan, 102 F.2d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 1939); In re Ewa Plantation
Co., 384 P.2d 287, 298 (Haw. 1963); Hammermill Paper Co. v. City of Erie, 372 Pa.
85, 95 A.2d 422 (1952).
101 County of Tuolumne v. State Board of Equalization, 206 Cal. App. 2d 352,
366, 24 Cal. Rptr. 113, 122 (1962).
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reasonable. 10 2 The assessor's right and duty to promulgate general
rules and formulas in order to secure uniform valuations is well-
established.10 3 Of course, "exact equality is not possible under any
system of taxation."" 4
CYCLICAL REAPPRAISAL PROGRAMS
In these days of industrial growth, population explosion, infla-
tion, and constantly changing property values, it has not been un-
usual for assessors to lag in their work. Properties once assessed at
full cash value are placed on current assessment roles at the value
determined in an earlier year, which is only a fraction of present
value. No discrimination or unfairness results if the properties are
assessed at the same uniform fraction of value. In Rittersbacher v.
Board of Supervisors"' the California Supreme Court held:
It is the assessor's recognized duty to see that the valuation placed
on the various kinds of property shall be in proportion to the worth
of such properties. If it is proportional and all are treated alike, no
one contends that the taxpayer must be charged a full hundred per
cent, for such is not required by the law. It is also recognized that
the assessment on personal property shall be on a basis which is fair
to the owners of real property so that neither shall suffer to the ad-
vantage of the other.10 6
Obviously, if full value assessments are reduced by a uniform
fraction, an inversely proportionate increase in tax rates will pro-
duce exactly the same tax revenue from the same property.'0 7 Ex-
perience indicates, however, that properties do not advance or de-
cline uniformly in value from year to year. Instead, some advance
rapidly while others depreciate in value. Under these circumstances
an annual reappraisal by the assessor of only part of a county (the
remainder of the county being placed on the current assessment
roll at values established in earlier years) may result in some assess-
ments that are excessive because made at a fraction of value or
ratio that exceeds the county-wide average. In many instances
county assessors have taken several years to reappraise an entire
102 Eastern-Columbia, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 2d 734, 143
P.2d 992, (1943).
103 Ibid.; Rittersbacher v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Cal. 535, 543, 32 P.2d 135,
139 (1934).
104 People v. Keith Railroad Equipment Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 339, 351, 161 P.2d
244, 252 (1945).
205 220 Cal. 535, 32 P.2d 135 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 592 (1934).
106 Id. at 543-44, 32 P.2d at 139.
107 Appeals are now pending, based on the last sentence of CAL. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1, and CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 401, in which appellants seek to compel assessment
of all properties at 100% of fair market value. Michels v. Watson, 2d Civ. No. L.A.
27595, and Hanks v. State Board of Equalization. Los Angeles Superior Court No.
813.198.
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county. The question arises whether it is legal to put the reappraised
properties on the current assessment roll at values increased over
prior years before the entire reappraisal has been completed.
This problem arose in Alberts v. Board of Supervisors.0 8 As
part of a continuing reassessment program two-thirds of San Mateo
County was reappraised in 1959 at 25 per cent of value. This re-
sulted in substantial increases over prior years' assessments in two-
thirds of the county. Assessments in the remainder of the county
were left unchanged. The reappraisals were made where the need
was greatest, as rapidly and as thoroughly as was possible. The
complaining taxpayers contended that changes in value should not
be added to the assessment roll until the entire program had been
completed. The court disagreed and upheld the assessments. The
basic reappraisal program was similar to one which had been up-
held by the United States Supreme Court in Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Township of Wakefield,' 0 despite an obvious but temporary in-
equality it produced. The court noted, however, that while the
complaining taxpayers had assumed that assessments in the area
not reappraised were at less than 25 per cent of value, they failed
to prove this. The case seemed to be distinguishable because of this
failure of proof.
Later a similar problem from another county came before the
same court in Lord v. County of Marin." Again the assessments
were upheld, the court remarking that "we approved a similar cycli-
cal reappraisal program carried on in San Mateo County.""' This
interpretation of its earlier opinion by the court would seem to be
decisive." 2 In these cases the California courts have clearly upheld
the validity of cyclical reappraisal programs where the assessor
has done his best to do his duty; quaere, what if he had done any-
thing less?
EVIDENCE AT BOARD HEARINGS
Despite expressions in some cases that the strict rules of evi-
dence do not apply in equalization hearings," 3 the county board
of equalization acts in a judicial capacity and thus can make orders
only on the basis of "legal evidence.""'
108 193 Cal. App. 2d. 225, 14 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1961).
109 247 U.S. 350 (1918).
110 214 Cal. App. 2d 25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1963).
Ill Id. at 27, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
112 Other similar cases are annotated at 76 A.L.R.2d 1071-81; see also Perry v.
State Tax Commission, 103 N.H. 264, 169 A.2d 765 (1961).
113 See, e.g., Rancho Santa Margarita v. County of San Diego, 135 Cal. App. 134,
142-43, 26 P.2d 716 (1933).
114 A. F. Gilmore Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. App. 2d 471, 476, 9
Cal. Rptr. 67, 71 (1960).
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In Oakland v. Southern Pacific Co." 5 the court stated that "it
has become the settled rule in this state that the board can only
act upon evidence in raising or lowering an assessment.""' In
Merchants Trust Co. v. Hopkins17 the court held that no "com-
petent evidence" of the value of the property was presented to
the board of equalization; hence "appellant did not sustain the
burden of proof which rested upon it in the proceeding before the
board of equalization to show the assessment was either unequal
or excessive and hence cannot now attack the action of the board
on either of those grounds."
Since the boards of equalization are created by the California
constitution,"' it would appear that their decisions may not be
based on inadmissible hearsay evidence to which objection was
made."' Even the Administrative Procedure Act, which does not
apply to equalization proceedings, provides that hearsay evidence
(although admissible for certain limited purposes) is not sufficient
to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection
in civil actions. 2 ' In some jurisdictions the hearsay rule has been
described not as a mere technical rule of evidence, but as a basic
rule of exclusion. 12
1
Exclusionary rules peculiar to equalization proceedings are
contained in Revenue and Taxation Code sections 408 and 451.
These rules deprive a taxpayer of access to property statements
and other information in the assessor's office which relate to the
property or business affairs of others. A similar provision of the
Personal Income Law122 has been upheld by the California Supreme
Court.
123
The United States Supreme Court has said that "the principles
governing the ascertainment of value for the purposes of taxation
are the same as those that control in condemnation cases . . 24
The same rule has been followed by the California courts. 25 Proof
115 131 Cal. 226, 63 Pac. 371 (1900).
116 Id. at 230, 63 Pac. at 372.
117 103 Cal. App. 473, 479, 284 Pac. 1072, 1074 (1936).
118 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 9.
"9 Cf., Englebretson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 170 Cal. 793, 151 Pac.
421 (1915).
120 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11513(c).
121 See, e.g., Novicki v. Department of Finance, 373 Ill. 342, 26 N.E.2d 130 (1940).
122 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19282.
123 Franchise Tax Board v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 2d 538, 225 P.2d 905 (1950).
124 Great Northern R. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135-39 (1936).
125 DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544
(1955) ; Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal. 2d 610, 623-24, 184 P.2d 879, 887 (1947).
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of fair market value is by the same methods developed in eminent
domain proceedings.2 6
Proof of the ratio of assessed value to fair market value
generally prevailing throughout the county should be relatively
simple. Section 1610 of the Revenue and Taxation Code requires
the presence of the assessor at equalization hearings, and the ques-
tion can be put to him. A study based upon a random sampling of
sales prices (reduced to their cash equivalent) and assessments
throughout the county should suffice, if the sampling is of adequate
size. Evidence that a petitioner's property is assessed at a sub-
stantially higher fraction of its value than several other properties
will justify an inference of overassessment.12 7
Because future Los Angeles County Board of Equalization
hearings will commence in September,128 after publication of the
State Board of Equalization ratio studies,2 those studies will be
available as evidence of the current ratio of assessed to fair market
value of locally-assessable tangible property. Other counties which
conduct their equalization hearings before such publication will
not enjoy this advantage.
Assessments and assessment ratios in other years appear to
be of little relevance. Assessment ratios have varied from county
to county, and within the same county from year to year, as illus-
trated by the following cases:
De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego' 80  35%
Fairfield Gardens v. County of Solano' s  25%
Victor Valley v. County of San Bernardino 32  20%
El Toro Development Co. v. County of Orange' 3s  70%
Birch v. County of Orange18 4 in 1916: 33y%
in 1918: 40%Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles'8 5  35%
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. County of Los Angeles'86 45%
Assessments made in prior years are separate and distinct from
126 See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957);
People v. Johnson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 712, 22 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1962).127 Birch v. County of Orange, 88 Cal. App. 82, 86, 262 Pac. 788, 789 (1927). In
re Brooks Building, 391 Pa. 94, 137 A.2d 273 (1958).
128 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 1750, 1760; Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 2077.
129 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 1818-19.
130 45 Cal. 2d 546, 559, 290 P.2d 544, 552 (1955).
181 45 Cal. 2d 575, 577, 290 P.2d 562, 564 (1955).
182 45 Cal. 2d 580, 583, 290 P.2d 565, 567 (1955).
133 45 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 290 P.2d 569, 570 (1955).
134 88 Cal. App. 82, 87, 262 Pac. 788, 790 (1927).
135 57 Cal. 2d 684, 697, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 612, 371 P.2d 340, 348 (1962).136 207 Cal. App. 2d 119, 123, 24 Cal. Rptr. 316, 318 (1962).
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those made for the present year. Hence they are not receivable as
evidence that this year's assessment is invalid.'37
PROCEDURE AT BOARD HEARINGS
Common sense is necessary to present a case successfully be-
fore a county board of equalization. Board members are not ex-
perienced judges, and they are not likely to have legal training.
Unlike the members of many administrative boards and commis-
sions, they are not selected because of any special competence to
perform their duties. They are elected officials, sensitive to criti-
cism, fundamentally eager to be fair, sharing a layman's intolerance
of legal technicalities, and impatient to decide cases promptly. The
"jugular vein" technique of advocacy is in order. Yet the experi-
enced lawyer realizes that he must always protect his record to
appeal from an adverse decision.
Probably the board's members will have been furnished with
copies of the excellent Handbook for County Boards of Equalization
prepared in 1960 by the County Supervisors Association of Cali-
fornia, which is written in language even a client should understand.
Intended to assist members of boards of equalization, it is also
invaluable to those who appear before them.
Pursuant to section 9 of article XIII of the California consti-
tution, Revenue and Taxation Code section 1605, and Government
Code section 25003, county boards of equalization customarily
adopt written rules of procedure which govern their proceedings.
These vary from county to county and often change. Copies may
be obtained from the clerk of the local county board of supervisors
who is ex officio clerk of the county board of equalization. Im-
portant provisions govern the form of petitions, meeting dates,
filing time, affidavits, subpoenas, and use of stenographic reporters.
Regulations for equalization proceedings of the State Board of
Equalization may be found in Title 18, Chapter 2 of the California
Administrative Code. These local rules, if reasonable, may not be
ignored; violating them could prove fatal to a client's cause.'
Although the board has power to regulate the order of proof,
it is customary for the taxpayer to proceed first in presenting the
evidence, since he has the burden of proof.' 9 A brief opening state-
'37 Southwest Land Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App. 9, 14-15, 188
Pac. 575, 577 (1920); In re Ewa Plantation Co., 384 P.2d 287, 290 (Haw. 1963);
Peck's Products Co. v. Bannister, 362 S.W. 596, 601. (Mo. 1962).
138 Williamson v. Payne, 25 Cal. App. 2d 497, 77 P.2d 900 (1938).
139 Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918);
Merchants Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 103 Cal. App. 473, 478-79, 284 Pac. 1072, 1074
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ment on behalf of the taxpayer often helps a board to understand
the testimony which follows. If the qualifications of an expertproperty valuation witness are already well-known to board mem-
bers, the attorney need not remind the board of them. Instead he
should protect the record by offering into evidence an affidavit of
the witness setting out his qualifications. Since the witness is pres-
ent under oath and subject to cross-examination, opposing counsel
will hesitate to object to this procedure. If he should object, the
taxpayer has gained an important psychological advantage.
If his position is doubtful, the attorney may withdraw the
offered affidavit and qualify the expert witness in the customary
fashion. If he does use affidavits, the attorney should furnish copies
to opposing counsel in advance of the hearing in order to save time.He should avoid the temptation to include in such an affidavit
material which is otherwise inadmissible, such as expressions of
opinion for which no foundation has been laid.
Questions from board members are often an unwelcome inter-
ruption, but they come more frequently than in court. The code
requires that relief must be denied by the board unless all pertinent
questions are answered. 140 The taxpayer's chances of success aregreatly enhanced if they are answered promptly, briefly, and
completely.
If an objection is sustained to evidence which has been offered,
the attorney must not neglect to make a proper offer of proof.Otherwise, in the event of a court review where there is no trialde novo on questions of valuation, the taxpayer may be assumed
to have abandoned the point. If the evidence is an essential part
of his prima facie case, a successful review in court would be
thwarted. 4'
JUDICIAL REvIEw
Judicial review of equalization hearings is by suit under Reve-
nue and Taxation Code section 5138 for refund of taxes paid underprotest, or by suit under section 5103 afer rejection by the board
of supervisors of a claim for refund. Mandamus and the other
extraordinary legal writs are not available to review either an
assessment or the action of the board of equalization, becauseprompt payment of taxes is vital to the operation of local govern-
ment. An action to recover a refund of taxes paid is an adequate
(1930); Wild Goose Country Club v. County of Butte, 60 Ca]. App. 339, 342, 212
Pac. 711, 712 (1922).
140 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 1608.
141 Bank of America v. Mundo, 37 Cal. 2d 1, 5, 229 P.2d 345, 347 (1951).
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legal remedy and is now the exclusive method of judicial review
of property tax proceedings. 4
There can be no trial de novo on issues which the board of
equalization has jurisdiction to determine. 14 3 The only issue for a
court is whether there was substantial evidence before the board
of equalization to support its determination. 44
142 Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Quinn, 54 Cal. 2d 507, 6 Cal. Rptr. 545, 354 P.2d 1
(1960); City of Long Beach v. Board of Supervisors, 50 Cal. 2d 674, 328 P.2d 964
(1958); Jillson v. Board of Supervisors of County of Sacramento, 221 A.C.A. 231,
34 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1963).
148 Bank of America v. Mundo, 37 Cal. 2d 1, 229, P.2d 345 (1951); Universal
Consolidated Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Cal. 2d 353, 153 P.2d 746 (1944).
144 Bank of America v. Mundo, 37 Cal. 2d 1, 229 P.2d 345 (1951); Kaiser Co.
v. Reid, 30 Cal. 2d 610, 626, 184 P.2d 879, 889 (1947).
